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COMMENTS
MEMBERSHIP, AFFILIATION, AND JENCKS
In a recent case, Jencks v. United States,' the United States Supreme Court
left undecided certain questions concerning the instructions of the trial court as
to membership in and affiliation with the Communist Party. A new trial was
awarded to the appellant. The majority was joined by Mr. Justice Burton only
because of his reluctance to accept the content of the trial court's instructions.
In his concurring opinion, in which he was joined by Mr. Justice Harlan, Justice
Burton states: "Were it not for the fact that I believe the trial court committed
reversible error in instructing the jury with respect to the meaning of membership
and affiliation, I would vacate the judgment below and remand to the trial
court . . .'2
The trial court gave the following instruction as to membership:
"In considering whether or not the defendant was a member of the Communist
Party, you may consider circumstantial evidence, as well as direct. You may
consider whether or not he attended Communist Party meetings, whether or
not he held an office in the Communist Party, whether or not he engaged in
other conduct consistent only with membership in the Communist Party and
all other evidence, either direct or circumstantial, which bears or may bear
upon the question of whether or not he was a member of the ... Party . ..,
Justice Burton criticized these instructions on the ground that they ". . . failed
to emphasize to the jury the essential element of membership in an organized
group-the desire of an individual to belong to the organization and a recog-
nition by the organization that it considers him as a member.""
Concerning the meaning of affiliation, Justice Burton criticized the trial
court's utilization of standard dictionary terminology. The trial court had stated:
"Affiliation ... means something less than membership but more than sympathy.
Affiliation with the Communist Party may be proved by either circumstantial
or direct evidence, or both."5 Justice Burton felt that this instruction was
inadequate since it allowed the petitioner to be convicted" . . . on the basis of
acts of intermittent cooperation. It did not require a continuing course of conduct
,on a fairly permanent basis' 'that could not be abruptly ended without giving at
least reasonable cause for the charge of a breach of good faith.' " Mr. Justice
Frankfurter also agreed that the instructions to the jury were erroneous.7
1353 U.S. 657 (1957).21d. at 678.
3Id. at 679.
4 Ibid.
O Ibid.
6 ld. at 679, 680.
7 Id. at 672.
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In a dissenting opinion Mr. Justice Clark felt that the instructions were
sufficient. However, he continued, "The court is sorely divided on this important
issue, and proper judicial administration requires that charges as to what con-
stitutes membership and affiliation in the Communist Party be announced."'
Membership
In February of 1956, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit put forth a judicial determination of the term "membership" in the
Fisher case. That court also criticized the instruction of the trial judge because
of his utilizing dictionary definitions employing synonyms. The court of appeals
felt that the instruction should have broken the term down into its component
parts. Basing its decision upon Galvan v. Press,"° the court said:
"Membership is composed of a desire on the part of the person in question
to belong to an organization and acceptance by the organization. Moreover,
certain actions are usually required such as paying dues, attending meetings
and doing some of the work of the group." 11
The appellant in the Fisher case contended that he could not be considered a
member of the Communist Party if he failed to comply with any of the formal
requisites for membership as stated in the constitution of the party. The court
indicated that the government had failed to answer this contention in its brief,
but then proceeded to ignore the question by announcing that the instruction was
erroneous because the jury was not reminded of the component parts of the
term "membership".
It would seem that the court in the Fisher case would strive for a generic
definition of the term, at least in its fundamental components. The court, how-
ever, made no definitive statement concerning the contention of the petitioner
that membership in the Communist Party must be established by a showing of
the fulfillment of the constitutional requirements of the party as to membership.
In another pertinent case, Ocon v. Guercio,1 2 Ocon, an alien, was charged
with a violation of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952.18 Section
24(a) (6) of that act makes it illegal for an alien to become, after entry, a member
of the Communist Party. Concerning Ocon's membership in the party, there was
testimony taken from two witnesses that Ocon had participated in Communist
meetings, that he had spoken to a group at a Communist meeting concerning
policies of the party, that he had attended meetings or conferences restricted
solely to the members of the party, that he had been seen at picnics, mass meet-
8Id. at 684 (dissent).
9 Fisher v. United States, 231 F.2d 99 (9th Cir. 1956).10347 U.S. 522 (1954).
1 Fisher v. United States, 231 F.2d 99, 107 (9th Cir. 1956).12237 F.2d 177 (9th Cir. 1956).
13 Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, 66 STAT. 163, 8 U.S.C. §1101 et seq.
(1952).
[Vol. VII
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ings, and picket lines sponsored by the party, that he had been seen at party
headquarters at various times and that he had paid dues to the party. As to this
evidence, the court said: "We hold that there is reasonable, substantial, and
probative evidence in the record of appellant's membership in the Communist
Party .. ."14 At the deportation hearings, Ocon was silent, from which an in-
ference was drawn concerning the validity of the charges based upon the testi-
mony. The court commented: "The decision ...was based on the testimony of
the two witnesses plus the inference. It is entirely possible that each witness' testi-
mony would have been enough to support the decision.""5 The Immigration and
Nationality Act requires that a decision of deportation be supported by reasonable,
substantial, and probative evidence.16 Therefore, if reasonable, substantial, and
probative evidence is admitted concerning one's membership in the Communist
Party, then a deportation decision is amply supported. In the Ocon case, such evi-
dence was equivalent to the testimony of two witnesses plus an inference; or, as
the court mentioned, the testimony alone might have been sufficient.
In searching for the golden thread interwoven through the case law through-
out the years, we come upon the time-worn but inescapable terminology, intent.
In 1909, a Vermont court indicated that membership in an association is a
question of intent." Intent was the primary requisite in the Galvan case,' 8 and
the concept is pointed up most recently in a 1955 decision of the United States
Court of Appeals for the First Circuit.19 In that case the defendant's husband
formally entered her name on the rolls of the party. She never intended to join
the party, and she took no active part in party activity. The trial judge found
that even though she did not intend to join the party, she was a member since,
"... after she discovered she was enrolled in the party, she took no efforts to
disassociate herself."20 The trial court would have demanded a sharp or definite
act of withdrawal from the party without dalliance. The court of appeals rejected
this theory, however, agreeing with the trial judge that there was no intent, but
then going beyond the definite withdrawal concept by theorizing that without
intent there was never any real membership in the party, and since there was no
real membership, there was no need for withdrawal.
It might be noted that the court in the above case speaks of real membership
and seems to equate this with membership that is intended. Another old but often
cited case in this regard is Colyear v. Skeffington,21 in which case the court states
14Ocon v. Guercio, 237 F.2d 177, 181 (9th Cir. 1956).
15 Ibid.II Op. cit. supra note 13, §242(b) (4).
17 Tarbell and Whitham v. Gifford, 82 Vt. 222; 72 At. 921 (1909).
18 Galvin v. Press, 347 U.S. 522 (1954).
19 Baghdasarian v. United States, 220 F.2d 677 (1st Cir. 1955).
201d. at 679.
21265 Fed. 17 (D. Ct. Mass. 1920).
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that ". . . such membership must be a rea membership in . . . the proscribed
organization.122
There are many federal statutes which contain the words "membership in
the Communist Party", but the one statute which, at first glance, seems to come
closest to a definition of membership in the Communist Party is The Communist
Control Act of 1954.23 Section 5 of that act lists thirteen criteria which may
be considered by the jury (via the trial judge's instructions) in determining
membership in the Communist Party. The legislative history of the Communist
Control Act suggests that some of the legislators would have treated section 5
as a definition of membership in the Party. But that suggestion is quickly
negated by Senator Humphrey, who introduced section 5 and who regarded such
section as establishing rules ". . . by which the court can hear evidence and in-
struct the jury."'" The view, therefore, that the Communist Control Act defines
membership in the Communist Party ". . . cannot be given much credence. "2 5
From what has gone before, it might be concluded that a rather strict or
narrow approach is taken as to what constitutes membership in the party. Before
becoming certain as to any strict connotation, however, it might be well to keep
in mind Sigurdron v. Landon."6 In that case, the court, relying upon the Galvan
case, pointed out that one does not necessarily have to be a conscious collaborator
in the Communist conspiracy but may have been an innocent victim of the
conspiracy. Also in Dickhoff v. Shaughnessy,27 where the court was concerned
with the question of mere nominal membership in the Party, the court said:
"It is enough that the alien joined the Party, aware that he was joining an or-
ganization known as the Communist Party which operates as a distinct and active
political organization, and that he did so of his own free will. "
2 8
Thus, the conclusion is inescapable that there are certain essential requisites
when a trial court instructs a jury concerning membership in the Communist
Party. Beginning with the fundamental ideas of intent, desire to belong, and
acceptance by the organization, we proceed to evidentiary requirements such as
those suggested by the Communist Control Act and past decisions. Any future
attempt by the courts concerning the real, true, or actual meaning of the term
must, of necessity, smack of deficiency. Some writers would suggest that no law
22 Colyear v. Skeffington, 265 Fed. 17, 72 (D. Ct. Mass. 1920).23Communist Control Act of 1954, PUB. L. No. 637, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. (Aug. 24,
1954).24100 Cong. Rec. 14091 (daily ed. Aug. 17, 1954).
25 ee YALE L. J. 712, 750 (1954-55).
26 215 F.2d 791 (9th Cir. 1954).
27 142 F.Supp. 535 (S.D.N.Y. 1956).
28Dickhoff v. Shaughnessy, 142 F.Supp. 535, 537 (S.D.N.Y. 1956), citing Galvan v.
Press, 347 U.S. 522 (1954).
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is better than deficient law, to which we must answer "Melius est Jus Deficiens
Quam ]us Incertum."2"
Affiliation
In the galaxy of ideas concerning the term "affiliation", our task is no less
uncertain. In the area of what was meant by membership, we were able to
anchor our concepts to a decision of the United States Supreme Court, the Galvan
case. In the area of the term affiliation, there is another Supreme Court decision,
Bridges v. Wixon,30 which shows the way. The pertinent part of that decision
begins with language indicative of the instruction of the trial judge in the Jencks
case: "[Affiliation] . . . imports . . . less than membership but more than
sympathy." 1 But then the court goes on to say:
"Whether intermittent or repeated, the act or acts tending to prove 'affiliation'
must be of that quality which indicates an adherence to or a furtherance of
the purposes or objectives of the proscribed organization as distinguished from
mere cooperation with it in lawful activities. The act or acts must evidence a
working alliance to bring the program to fruition."
32
The Bridges case relies heavily upon a 1935 decision, Kettunen v. Reimer,"8
which talks about affiliation in the following terms:
"Affiliation includes an element of dependability upon which the organization
can rely which, though not equivalent to membership duty, does rest upon a
course of conduct that could not be abruptly ended without giving at least
reasonable cause for the charge of a breach of good faith."84
This language is identical with the language in Wheeler v. Third National Bank.85
Finally, we arrive at the most recent determination of the term in the Fisher
case where the court, in analyzing the definition given by the trial judge, states:
"The question is whether the definition given by the trial judge was sufficient
to get across to the jury the idea of a continuing reciprocal relationship
involving duties and responsibilities. The proper test to apply is whether
one could be convicted under the instruction which was given who was only
in sympathy with the aims of the Communist Party, and who occasionally
would, say, distribute literature for it but without any obligation to do so or
to continue to do so. He would have connected himself with the Communist
Party. He would be its ally." 86
Even a superficial analysis of the instruction of the trial court in the Jencks
case will reveal that the court omitted essential elements of the concept of
29 "Law that is deficient is better than law that is uncertain."
80326 U.S. 135 (1945).
31 Id. at 143.
2 Id. at 143, 144.
83 79 F.2d 315 (2nd Cir. 1935).
14Id. at 317.
35 303 Ky. 300, 197 S.W.2d 606 (1946).
86 Fisher v. United States, 231 F.2d 99, (9th Cir. 1956).
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affiliation, the most important of which were: the element of dependability, a
furtherance of the objectives of the proscribed organization, a continuing course
of conduct which could not be abruptly ended including reciprocal responsibilities
and duties. The Bridges test must be applied to all instructions regarding affiliation
with the Communist Party.
With reluctance, it must be admitted that the majority opinion in the Jencks
case has overlooked this important issue. It is with great relief, however, that
we are able to recognize that there is such an important problem through the
insight of four members of the same court.
JOHN E. MURRAY, JR.
RECENT CASES
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT-PUPIL ASSIGNMENT
LAWS-The school law of Virginia provides for a Pupil Placement Board charged
with the duty of assigning students to schools. In making such assignments, the
Board was to consider "the effect of the enrollment on the welfare and best interests
of the child and all other children in said school as well as the effect on the
efficiency of the operation of said school; the sociological, psychological and like
intangible social scientific factors as will prevent, as nearly as possible, a condition
of socio-economic class consciousness among the pupils; and such other relevant
matters as may be pertinent to the efficient operation of the schools or indicate a
clear and present danger to the public peace and tranquility affecting the safety or
welfare of the citizens of such school district." The present action was brought
by Negro school children and their parents to require the defendants to cease
and desist from any practices, customs, or usages in segregating school students.
The United States District Court declared the above law to be unconstitutional
after considering the obvious intent of the Virginia legislature to maintain
segregation. Adkins v. School Board of Newport News, 148 F. Supp. 430 (E.D.
Va. 1957"), cert. denied, 26 U.S.L. WEEK 3128 (U.S. Oct. 22, 1957).
The Virginia Pupil Placement law is but one of many similar statutes passed
by various southern states in an effort to continue unchanged the former patterns
of public school attendance, the total segregation of white and Negro. Thus, as
an exercise of the state's police power, these laws are enacted to provide for the
public welfare by promoting the health, safety, order and efficient education of
the people. ALA. LAWS REG. SESS. c. 31380 (1956) (preamble), FLA. LAWS
EXTRAORDINARY SESS. c. 31380 (1956) (preamble). Prior to 1954, there was
no need for such assignment laws. Under the doctrine of Plessy v. Ferguson, the
states were able to continue the practice of segregation so long as equal facilities
were provided for all races. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896). In 1954,
however, the controversial doctrine of "separate but equal" facilities was dis-
carded by the Supreme Court, and segregation in the public schools by virtue of
race was held to be unconstitutional. Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483
(1954).
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